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Abstract—Privacy in Online Social Networks (OSNs) evolved
from a niche topic to a broadly discussed issue in a wide variety
of media. Nevertheless, OSNs drastically increase the amount of
information that can be found about individuals on the web. To
estimate the dimension of data leakage in OSNs, we measure
the real exposure of user content of 4,182 Facebook users from
102 countries in the most popular OSN, Facebook. We further
quantify the impact of a comprehensible privacy control interface
that has been shown to extremely decrease configuration efforts
as well as misconfiguration in audience selection.
Our study highlights the importance of usable security. (i) The
total amount of content that is visible to Facebook users does
not dramatically decrease by simplifying the audience selection
interface, but the composition of the visible content changes. (ii)
Which information is uploaded to Facebook as well as which
information is shared with whom strongly depends on the user’s
country of origin.
Index Terms—Social Networks, Privacy Control, Facebook
I. INTRODUCTION
Online Social Networks (OSNs), such as Facebook or
google+, have about one billion users1 in 2015. OSNs allow
their users to create and maintain a personal user profile and
connect this profile with others by declaring friendship rela-
tions. Amongst communication functionalities, sharing content
and personal information is the core of OSN sites. Content
sharing serves communication and self-expression needs of
OSN users, but raises privacy concerns at the same time.
There is an ongoing discussion about how to handle those
privacy concerns. The CEOs of Google and Facebook argue
that we live in a post-privacy world [2], [3]. We shall accept
the fact that there is no privacy anymore and adapt ourselves
to the new situation. On the other side of the discussion
spectrum, privacy advocates fear oversharing of content [15] to
avoid undesired effects such as that employers are accessing
private information to draw undesired conclusions. In spite
of this discussion, the real privacy preferences of the social
networking community are still not entirely known.
Studying the actual privacy settings of Facebook users (e.g.
[12]) does also not tell the whole story about content sharing
and privacy preferences, since users are commonly unable to
select the desired audience [15], [16]. We thus developed a
color-based interface to simplify the audience selection for
user content in Facebook (Figure 1; detailed description in
Section III-B). This interface is shown to drastically decrease
1http://allfacebook.de/userdata/, Accessed 2015-03-06
both the effort and the error probability when handling privacy
settings [19].
Fig. 1. Example for an attribute’s privacy setting (User’s Birthday)
This color coding-based interface is published in the shape
of an add-on (plug-in) for the Firefox and Chrome browsers
and made available to the public over various channels on the
web. This plug-in is called Facebook Privacy Watcher (FPW).
Several newspapers, blogs and even radio and TV stations
reported about it2 3. More than 44,000 users downloaded the
FPW.
We asked the FPW users to send us anonymized feedback
with consent, to improve the plug-in and to evaluate the impact
of the plug-in on user’s privacy. We received 9,296 feedback
responses originated from 102 countries. These responses in-
cluded the privacy settings of the user profiles and the changes
that were made with the help of our plug-in. Furthermore, we
received the number of friends, photos, likes, notes and map
entries as well as the binary information for each user profile
data field (denoted profile field in the remainder) whether it is
filled with data or not.
Based on this dataset, we evaluate the real exposure of
private user data in Facebook and the content sharing pref-
erences of the FPW users. We evaluate the privacy settings
before and after introducing a comprehensible visualization
of privacy handle as well as the changes that have been
performed. By reason that the results strongly differ with
respect to different countries, we also performed evaluations
that focus on national differences. Assuming that increasing or
decreasing the visibility of parts of the user profiles expresses
the desires of users to have more or less privacy, we compared
the user profiles of users who use the FPW to achieve more
privacy with those who decided to publish more private data.
Our results indicate that we indeed do not live in a post
privacy world: The users intentionally hide content from being
publicly accessed and do not accept the default privacy settings
even before using our plug-in. With the help of the FPW, users
hide critical data fields such as friend lists and family member
2http://www.masrawy.com/news/Technology/General/2012/October/31/
5420245.aspx, Accessed 2015-03-06
3http://www.golem.de/news/facebook-firefox-erweiterung-macht-die-
privatsphaere-bunt-1212-96091.html, Accessed 2015-03-06
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markers but publish birthdays and religious views. The total
amount of content which is visible to Facebook users does
not dramatically decrease after introducing a comprehensible
visualization of privacy controls, but the composition of the
visible content changes. The content sharing patterns are
strongly depending on their country of origin.
Our contributions in this paper are (i) to provide an un-
derstanding of the content sharing preferences of FPW users
both in general and (ii) with respect to different countries and
(iii) to explain and quantify the effect of improved usability of
privacy interfaces on privacy settings. We further (iv) depict
relations between privacy preferences and profile properties
by means of cluster analyses. An important highlight is that
we are not limited to public-available data. Due to the FPW
feedback data, we can take the user profile owner’s point of
view on her privacy settings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We
discuss the related work in Section II and provide a detailed
data description in Section III. In Section IV, we evaluate the
privacy settings of FPW users and the impact of introducing a
comprehensible audience selection without mentioning coun-
try specific differences. Because of vast differences amongst
users from different countries, we provide a deeper analysis
of those specifics in Section V. The relation between sharing
preferences and quantifiable user profile properties such as the
numbers of friends, likes and photos are evaluated in Section
VI. We summarize our findings and conclude our work in
Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Privacy is a topic that is broadly addressed by plenty of
publications in computer science. In this section, we discuss
works on privacy in OSNs with the focus on user behavior
and interface construction in OSNs rather than systems or
algorithms. Since we discuss a new privacy settings interface,
default privacy settings and privacy awareness in this paper,
we particularly focus on papers about privacy by design as
well as on papers suggesting interfaces for privacy settings in
OSNs.
Works on privacy by design are built on the assumption that
people do not tend to change their privacy settings. Gross and
Acquisti state that "We can conclude that only a vanishingly
small number of users change the (permissive) default privacy
preferences" [8]. Based on this logic, the authors suggest to
implement default privacy rules that prevent leakage of data.
In contrast to this paper, we evaluate how much a better
interface helps the users to meet their needs by avoiding
misconfiguration, and compare the sharing preferences with
respect to the user’s country of origin. Furthermore, our results
show that more than 59% of the privacy settings do not stay
untouched in case of using our plug-in.
In 2008, Krishnamurthy and Wills [12] examined privacy
settings in Facebook, Myspace, Bebo and Twitter based on
crawler-gathered data. They discovered that there is some use
of privacy settings but there is still a significant portion of
users who allow strangers to access private information. They
further examined the amount of information which is shared
within regional networks and discovered a negative correlation
between network size and the amount of shared information.
In comparison to [12], we focus on Facebook, obtain our data
directly from the uses, evaluate the impact of our color-based
privacy setting interface and get different results regarding the
users disposition to change privacy settings.
Stutzman et al. [22] monitored the public-available data of
5,076 members of the Carnegie Mellon University from 2005
till 2011. They discovered an increasing privacy awareness
over time. Johnson et al. [11] surveyed 260 participants from
the United States, recruited via ResearchMatch, by using a
Facebook application. They asked questions with the back-
ground knowledge which was obtained by reading the partici-
pant’s Facebook profile via API. Inter alia, they discovered that
94.6% of their participants denied access to their content by
people outside their friend network. Mondal et al. [18] studied
the use of social access control lists (SACLs). The friend
list usage of 1,165 users of tool “Friendlist Manager”, has
been analyzed. They found “that a surprisingly large fraction
(17.6%) of content is shared with SACLs. However, we also
find that the SACL membership shows little correlation with
either profile information or social network links; as a result,
it is difficult to predict the subset of a user’s friends likely to
appear in a SACL.”
Beside the FPW, other approaches to help users to mitigate
the misconfiguration exist, too. Lipford et al. [14] suggest to
allow users take the point of view of the expected audience.
PViz [17] is a privacy setting approach based on visualizations
group visualizations in different granularities. Carminati et al.
[6] suggest rule-based privacy settings that define types of
relationships and a set of rules which type of relationship is
a precondition to access a certain data object. Fang et al. [7]
propose a machine learning based approach which implements
a wizard that suggests a set of access rules. The idea is to learn
implicit rules which are applied by users to set the visibility
of objects. In contrast, our interface allows both: to quickly
grasp the visibility of content items based on a color coding
and to change those settings with a single click.
Other related work can be found in studies about Facebook
user statistics [21], a report4 about the evolution of privacy in
Facebook and a survey in [10] where consumers have been
asked which information they consider to be private. [21],
[10] also contain cross-country comparison. However, the user
statistics do not provide information about privacy settings and
the consumer survey does rely on questionnaires without a
concrete link to social networks.
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND DATASET DESCRIPTION
In this section, we specify the setup of our study by de-
scribing our ethical considerations, the browser extension FPW
which has been used to collect the data and the precise data
collection methods. To underline the adequacy of our color-
coding audience selection interface to be used in this study,
4http://mattmckeon.com/facebook-privacy/, Accessed 2015-03-06
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we describe essences on the feedback from study participants.
We further depict which and how much data we were able to
collect in this study and describe basic user profile statistics of
the participants. The bias as a result of a non-random selection
of study participants is also discussed in this section.
A. Ethical Considerations
We protect the privacy of our study participants! Neither the
download logfile which we used to estimate the dissemination
of the FPW, nor the feedback answers that we collected are
linked to individuals. For this study, we asked the FPW users
to send us feedback with consent. We explained the reason for
collecting the data and allowed users to access and verify the
data before sending it to our server. All feedback responses
that we used in this study are anonymized. We keep the
collected data confidential to protect all study participants from
deanonymization attempts and do only publish aggregated
data.
B. The Facebook Privacy Watcher
In Facebook, the user can choose between a number of
visibility-levels for each information in her profile, namely:
’Everyone’, ’Friends’, ’Custom’ and ’Only me’. The ’Custom’
setting allows users to authorize single friends or groups of
friends (e. g., ’colleagues’ and ’good friends’) to access certain
information. In previous work [19], a new type of interface has
been presented, which is based on a color coding (Figure 1).
The used colors are guided by the well-known traffic light
colors, adding blue to represent custom settings. Results of
changes (initiated by clicking at the respective color box) are
shown instantly for direct success control of each action. We
used the following color scheme:
• Red: Visible to nobody
• Blue: Visible to selected friends
• Yellow: Visible to all friends
• Green: Visible to everyone
Fig. 2. Screenshots of photo albums, colorized by the FPW
This color scheme is in-line with the sympathy of the ma-
jority of the users (Section III-D). Figure 2 shows a screenshot
of colorized photo albums as an example for colorized profile
fields. Clicking at the colorized boxes changes the privacy
settings. A tooltip helps the users to remember the meaning
of each color. The color scheme can be adopted to individual
user needs. To help color-blind FPW users, we included the
possibility to use different stripy patterns instead of colors.
The FPW has support for English, German, French, Italian
and Arabic.
C. Data Collection
We gathered data about the FPW from two sources. The first
is the download log file at our own server, where the plug-in
can be downloaded from. The second source of data is the set
of feedback responses which have been sent to us. While the
first source gives us insights into the spreading process of the
plug-in, the second source allows us to draw a picture of the
plug-in usage as well as its impact on privacy settings of the
users’ profiles.
1) Download Log: Analyzing the download logfile enabled
us to understand the time and locality dimensions of the FPW
dissemination. We discovered strong peaks subsequently to
the moments of publication in different venues as well as
that a large user basis is originated in Germany and Egypt.
We further discovered a couple of sites, offering to download
our plug-in56 Thus, we only have an incomplete view on the
actual downloads by analyzing our own download log. Some
of those alternative download sites publish the number of
downloads. Adding the number of downloads from our site
to those external download counters, we estimate the total
number of download to be higher than 44,800, coming at least
from 102 countries. One year after our first FPW publication,
11,000 users are still following every update that we offer.
2) User Feedback: The usual life-cycle of an FPW instance
starts with the installation process and resumes with a check of
the privacy settings of the own profile during a few sessions (1-
5). The plug-in is sparely used afterwards. We asked our users
to provide us feedback after activating the plug-in three times,
which usually happened within the first days after installation.
We asked for feedback about both: the general idea of
coloring the profile items to simplify the privacy settings and
the implementation of our plug-in. Furthermore, we offered
two text fields to enter comments and suggestions concerning
the idea as well as the implementation. We explicitly informed
our users about the exact (anonymized) data that we collected.
From 2012-10-15 till 2014-07-07, we received 9,296 feedback
responses from 4,182 users in 102 countries that included col-
oring and log file information. We received multiple answers
from users in Germany. We asked German users twice to give
us Feedback: once - in German language - at the time before
the FPW was internationally spread and a second time after
introducing multiple language packs. We used the more recent
feedbacks to replace older onces in the analysis in case of
multiple copies from the same user.
We collected the following information from our users:
• a hash value of the Facebook - UIN
• the counter (including timestamps), indicating how often
the plug-in was activated
5http://www.chip.de/downloads/Facebook-Privacy-Watcher-fuer-
Firefox_57997141.html,Accessed2015-03-06
6http://www.computerbild.de/download/Facebook-Privacy-Watcher-
7834052.html,Accessed2015-03-06
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Country # Feedback responses
Germany 7,581
Egypt 272
Austria 218
United States 150
Switzerland 147
France 94
Spain 72
Netherlands 62
TABLE I
THE NUMBER OF FEEDBACK RESPONSES THAT WE RECEIVED FROM THE
TOP EIGHT COUNTRIES
• the visibility of each profile field before the first usage
of our plug-in happened
• the visibility of each profile field after using our plug-in
• the type and visibility of timeline entries
• the number of friends
• the number of photos and labels
• the number of likes
Furthermore, our server, which gathered the feedback data,
ran a script to extract the countries from which we received
the feedback.
D. Users’ Acceptance of the FPW
It is essential for the success of the study that participants
are willing integrate the tool in their normal OSN usage and
to use it more than only once. The FPW and the realized user
interface hence need to be both: beneficial for the participants
and easily usable. Thus, the first question which we asked our
users in the feedback formula was: ’How do you like the idea
of colorizing in this plug-in?’. The overwhelming majority
rated this idea as ’very good’ (65.66%) or ’good’ (32.2%).
Less than one percent rated the idea to be ’medium’ (0.98%),
’bad’ (0.46%) or ’very bad’ (0.7%).
Creating the color scheme, we argued in the team which
type of color scheme is more intuitive to the users: green,
inspired by traffic lights meaning ’go’ - corresponding in
the color scheme to be visible to everybody or green in the
meaning of being safe since the item is not visible to anybody.
This question has been asked in the previous user study with
40 participants. 60% of the participants preferred the green to
represent the setting meaning ’visible to everybody’. It roughly
meets the results in this study (54.83% vs. 45.17%). Please
note: The FPW equally offers both color schemes and the
users are asked to choose in advance. The setting can later
be changed. Color blind people have been offered to choose
hachures instead of colors.
The second question that we asked the FPW users was:
’How do you like the implementation of this browser exten-
sion?’. The implementation was not rated as good as the idea
of using colors for setting privacy (Table II). Evaluating the
comments, we can find the following reasons: The plug-in
did not work from 7th of November 2013, 2:30 am, till 8th of
November, 3:30 (am, CET), because of Facebook site changes.
During this time, we received most of the negative ratings.
Furthermore, we suffered from a bug in the first version that
delayed the Facebook usage.
Rating Percentage
Very good 32.34
Good 61.34
Medium 3.44
Bad 1.83
Very bad 1.05
TABLE II
HOW DO YOU LIKE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FPW?
E. Sample Bias and Basic User Profile Statistics
We recruited our sample (FPW users) via an announcement
on our homepage and by sending press releases to specialized
press. We then witnessed a viral spreading process based on
word-of-mouth advertising. The attention of mass media such
as news papers7, radio stations8 and an Egyptian web portal [1]
followed afterwards. In spite of the broad audience of the re-
spective media, the set of participants is by no means random.
We decided not to collect detailed demographic informations
about FPW users, since this would be inappropriate for a tool
that has been advertised to support user’s privacy. Instead, we
provide technical information such as statistics about the user
profiles (Table III) to allow the sample bias to be appraised:
X X = 0 X X˜ σX
Friends 0% 148.75 96 159.53
Photos 3.43% 181.69 32 572.62
Labels on photos 34.45% 20.54 3 64.45
Photo albums 3.49% 10.71 7 20.05
Locations 17.07% 38.68 4 101.65
Likes 10.06% 90.04 36 145.33
Notes 86.94% 1.49 0 19.5
TABLE III
BASIC PROFILE STATISTICS: PERCENTAGE OF PROFILES WITHOUT ANY
ENTRY IN FIELD X (X = 0) AND THE AVERAGE (X ), MEDIAN (X˜ ) AND
STANDARD DEVIATION (σX ) OF THE NUMBER OF ENTRIES IN FIELD X
Our median user has 96 friends, liked 36 pages and shared
32 pictures. Many users have just a few friends (Figure 3) and
a few of them have plenty of friends. The degree distribution of
the friendship graph as well as the median number of friends
is similar to those of the whole Facebook graph [23]. We
interpret this as an evidence that our FPW users are close to
normal with respect to the number of friends.
IV. GLOBAL PRIVACY EVALUATION
In this section, we elaborate which data FPA users upload to
Facebook and who is allowed to access it without mentioning
7http://www.handelsblatt.com/technologie/it-tk/it-internet/facebook-
privacy-watcher-im-einsatz-gegen-den-daten-kraken-seite-all/7388782-
all.html,Accessed2015-03-06
8http://www.ffh.de/news-service/magazin/toController/Topic/toAction/
show/toId/3371/toTopic/die-facebook-ampel-fuer-sichere-postings.html,
Accessed2015-03-06
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Fig. 3. Histogram: number of friends
cultural differences amongst users from various countries to
provide a holistic view. We further quantify the impact of the
FPW on the privacy settings and compare the standard privacy
settings in Facebook with the actual user decisions to quantify
the total demand for modifying the Facebook standard privacy
setting to meet users’ needs.
Because of the typical life-cycle of the plug-in instances
(Section III-C2), three data views are available: the privacy
settings before using the plug-in, after using the plug-in and
the changes that have been made. We avoid the redundancy
which would be caused by presenting the three possible points
of view. We instead focus on the settings after applying our
plug-in and the changes which have been made.
A. Exposure of User Data
A Facebook profile can consist of 28 data fields in total. To
estimate the potential privacy risk, it is crucial to know which
parts of the profile are filled with data and thus potentially
exposed to the risk of being accessed by subjects which are
not part of the set of desired recipients. The average filling
ratio of the profile fields that allow users to select the audience
is given in Figure 4.
The profile fields friend list, Timeline entries, photo albums,
map entries and notes are lists of items that are technically
always available. The number of items included in the users
profiles can be found in Tables VI and VII. Subscriptions are
also not included in Figure 4. They allow users to follow
other users’ updates (e.g. news of famous actors) without
befriending with them. It is possible to determine the visibility
of subscriptions without subscribing anything. According to
our ethical considerations, we only store the visibility of data
fields but not their content. We thus are not sure whether a
user subscribed to any newsfeed.
The fields gender, e-mail and birthday are obligatory to
create a user profile on Facebook. Hence, every user profile
encloses this data (not necessarily honest). None of the other
profile fields are filled by all users. The fields family, current
city, relationship status, hometown, employer and school are
filled with data by the majority of users. Only few FPW users
uploaded skills and phone numbers to Facebook. Please note
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Fig. 4. Histogram of the ratio, the user profile fields are filled
that we can only check whether data is included or not. We
have no means to verify it.
B. Visibility of User Profiles Fields
Website
University
Timeline-entry
School
Religious views
Relationship status
Quotations
Political views
Photo album
Other phones
Mobile phones
Languages
Interested in
Instant messenger
Hometown
Friendlist
Family
Employer
Emails
Current city
Birthday
Address
About you
Subscriptions
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Public Friends Only me Custom
Fig. 5. Visibility of user profile fields
Figure 5 shows the cumulated visibility of the profile fields
of FPW users. The most popular setting is to share content
items with all friends. The second most frequently used setting
is to share items with the public. Sharing bits of information
with only a subset of friends (’custom’) or hiding them (’only
me’) is not very popular.
More than one third of the users do not restrict access to the
fields: current city, employer, friend list, hometown, languages,
school and university. These profile fields may help attackers
to collect sufficient information to deploy social engineering
attacks. The friend list is especially dangerous to publish, since
sharing the friend list helps attackers to traverse through the
5
social graph using crawlers. Furthermore, inference attacks
[13] are fostered by publishing the friend list. These kinds
of attacks are based on the assumption that friends share
similarities (e.g. similar age). An attacker can infer hidden
profile attributes in case that friendship connections are known
to the attacker and friends disclose the information of interest.
The custom setting is used for phone numbers in more than
95% of those cases where this information is included into
the user profile. More than a quarter of our study participants
share the birthday, political views and religious views just
with a subset of their friends. The fact that a non-negligible
number of users use the setting ’only me’ is remarkable. It
makes sense that people disclose information in fields that are
technically necessary (e.g. the friend list) in case that they
do not want to share them with others. However, uploading
other fields to Facebook without sharing it with anybody does
not help to socialize with others. We assume fields with this
visibility setting to be a result of increased privacy awareness.
Previously visible informations seems to be hidden.
n = 3597
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n = 8411
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App on Facebook
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Fig. 6. Privacy settings of timeline entries
Timeline entries are similar to posts in a newsfeed and can
have many different types. Figure 6 shows the visibility of all
types of timeline entries. The main findings are that:
• the setting ’friend’ is even more dominant than in other
parts of the profile
• less entries are visible to the public
• posts from external pages (e.g. commercial pages) and
cover photo changes are always public
• the setting ’only me’ is rarely used in general
• the most frequently hidden timeline entries are likes from
external pages, posts from other users and posts from apps
• photos of other users are often shared with only a subset
of friends
C. Privacy Impact of Simplified Audience Selection
Many Facebook users are unable to handle the privacy
settings to meet their own sharing preferences [15], [16].
It is hence not sufficient to elaborate the actual privacy
settings to study the sharing preferences. Since the color-
coding based privacy setting interface is shown to drastically
decrease mistakes in selecting the audience [19], elaborating
the impact of the FPW helps to understand the gap between
sharing interests and actual privacy settings.
With the help of our plug-in, 22.31% of the users change
the visibility to a more restrictive setting, 19.55% of the users
prefer less restrictive settings and 5.44% keep the average
privacy by changing the visibility of different items equally
to both directions. 52.14% of the users do not change the
profile visibility compared to the settings before installing our
plug-in.
The group of users who did not change any setting contains
many inactive people with small user profiles as well as those
who sent us feedback during the first session with activated
FPW. All users who were not able to change any setting
because of facing technical problems are also part of this
group. In spite of not changing the settings, some users sent
us feedback to state that the plug-in is very useful to check
the settings with very little effort.
26.5% 4.4% 1.5%
23.2% 8.8% 4.6%
2.8% 4.8% 1.6%
9.2% 9.9% 2.7%Custom
Only me
Friends
Public
Public Friends Only me Custom
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Fig. 7. Heat map of visibility levels reflecting visibility change actions,
performed with the help of the new interface (from, to)
In the remainder of this section, we focus on users who
change the visibility of profile fields using the FPW. Figure 7
shows a heat map that illustrates change actions with respect to
the visibility level before and after performing the actions. The
most frequently performed action is to change the visibility
from ’public’ to ’friends’. The opposite change action is the
second most frequently performed action.
With the help of the FPW, users hide more information
(’only me’) from public or friends than providing access to
content. Remarkable is that the custom visibility setting, which
is explicitly supported by our interface, is more likely to be
removed than being newly used. Many users seem not to be
happy to distinguish among different groups of friends. They
instead prefer to either publish content without restrictions or
among all friends.
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Fig. 8. Percentage of users who changed the visibility of certain profile
fields; only filled fields are mentioned
Figure 8 depicts the exact percentage of items per profile
field where users changed the visibility with the FPW. We
only included those 2816 users whose privacy has finally been
affected by the FPW. The highest demand for changes can be
seen in the timeline entries. A user profiles in Facebook can
enfold plenty of timeline entries but only a single entry in
many other fields (e.g. birthday). The visibility of the employer
has been changed by the second largest fraction of users,
followed by the university and the friend list.
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Fig. 9. Fraction of change actions with the help of the FPW towards more
or less privacy per profile field
The tendency of performed changes towards more or less
privacy in different profile fields is shown in Figure 9. Timeline
entries, birthdays, about you, quotations, religious views, in-
stant messagers, political views and e-mail addresses are those
fields where more change actions towards less privacy have
been performed. The rest of the profile fields are more private
in average after using the FPW.
D. Comparison with Facebook Standard Privacy Settings
Advocates of the concept ’privacy by default’ argue that
people do not tend to change the default settings. Following
this argumentation, and taking the user’s audience selection
efforts into account, an interesting question is how the defaults
should look like to be in line with the user’s needs. We thus
compare the default settings with the actual privacy settings.
The Facebook default settings consist of two visibility
levels: public and friends. The heat map in Figure 10 shows a
comparison of the standard settings with the condition before
applying the changes with the new interface: 43.6% of all
profile fields, which are shared with public according to the
Facebook standard, are publicly accessible. 39.2% of these
public fields have been changed to be accessible only by
friends. 49.2% of the by default friend-visible profile fields
are still friend-visible before using the FPW and 38.4% of
profile of the latter are visible to just a subset of friends.
43.6% 39.2% 7.9% 9.3%
5.7% 49.2% 6.8% 38.4%Friends
Public
Public Friends Only me Custom
Before using the add-on
De
fa
ult
 se
ttin
g
Fig. 10. Heat map that illustrates the privacy setting changes from Facebook
standard (ordinate) to individual settings (abscissa) before using the new
interface
Figure 11 illustrates the comparison of standard settings
with the situation after using the FPW. In spite of many users
changing profile settings, the cumulated amount of visible
content does not change dramatically. 21.05% of the users
used the plug-in to reduce the visibility of data objects in
average by changing the standard settings. 10.44% changed
the standard settings to the opposite direction. Our evaluation
shows that the visibility of profile fields is still conform with
the standard settings in many cases. 40.56% of the public fields
are still unchanged after using the plug-in. That is also true
for 49.93% of the fields which are friend-visible by default.
40.1% 41.7% 9.4% 8.8%
7.0% 49.1% 7.7% 36.2%Friends
Public
Public Friends Only me Custom
After using the add-on
De
fa
ult
 se
ttin
g
Fig. 11. Heat map that illustrates the privacy setting changes from Facebook
standard (ordinate) to individual settings (abscissa) after using the new
interface
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V. COUNTRY-SPECIFIC PRIVACY EVALUATIONS
Since privacy preferences are depending on cultural back-
grounds of users [10], we detail the global evaluations by
comparing the actual privacy settings as well as the impact
of the FPW with respect to the user’s country of origin. Due
to space limitations, we abstain from including every single
profile field and concentrate on the examples showing the
strongest variations.
As a result of constraints in our dataset, the cross-country
comparisons suffer from differences in sample sizes. We ad-
dress this issue in the following evaluations by normalizing all
data and comparing only fractions (proportions) and medians
which are rather stable with respect to different sample sizes.
Also, we only include samples which are big enough to be
stable against outliers and only apply extremely conservative
statistic testing. Since we used the same method for acquiring
study participants in all countries, we assume a potential bias
to equally occur amongst the considered countries. Hence,
we assume the comparability of our samples from various
countries to be valid. Germany is a special case since our
university is well known and receives more attention and trust
here.
A. Exposure and Visibility of Personal Data in Different
Countries
FPW users from different countries have different sharing
interests. This can be shown by comparing both: the infor-
mation which is enclosed into the user profiles (filled fields)
as well as privacy settings. Figure 12 shows the cumulated
differences among the eight countries with feedback of more
than 50 users. We cumulate all profile fields of all users in
the respective country and compare the total proportions of
content according to their visibility.
Austria
Switzerland
Germany
Egypt
Spain
France
Netherlands
United States
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Public Friends Only me Custom
Fig. 12. Cumulated privacy settings in different countries; sample sizes can
be found in Table 1
The most obvious result in our evaluation is that Egyptian
users tend to share more information with the public than
others. The latter also tend to hide the highest fraction of
information (setting: ’only me’) from anybody. Compared with
the other seven countries, they tend to either publish content
or not, rather than sharing with friends. We thus formulate the
hypothesis that people in Egypt tend to use their Facebook
profile as a tool to present themselves rather than to share
content with their friends. Users from other Arabic countries
seem to show a similar behavior, but the sample size is too
Country Country W p-value BH Setting
Egypt Austria 3926 0.00010 0.00131 Friends
Egypt Switzerland 1613 0.00015 0.00131 Public
Egypt Switzerland 2380.5 0.00010 0.00131 Friends
Egypt France 1974.5 0.00080 0.00378 Public
Egypt Netherlands 1800.5 0.00039 0.00221 Public
Egypt Netherlands 484 0.00018 0.00131 Friends
Germany USA 29431 0.00779 0.02726 Only me
France Switzerland 752.5 0.00533 0.02133 Custom
TABLE IV
SUBSET OF SIGNIFICANT RESULTS OF THE PAIRWISE MANN–WHITNEY U
TEST OF CUMULATED THE DATA IN FIGURE 12; W = TEST STATISTIC; BH
= BENJAMINI & HOCHBERG CORRECTION FOR MULTIPLE COMPARISONS
small to provide meaningful results to include them into this
paper.
French users include the highest fraction of content to their
profiles which is visible for just a subset of their friends. FPW
users from Germany and the USA show significant differences
in hiding content from others (setting: ’only me’). Many other
differences can be seen (Figure 12), but they are not significant
according to our extremely strict criteria.
We tested the significance of country-specific differences
by applying the Mann–Whitney U-test (with continuity cor-
rection) on four distinct datasets. We compared (country pair-
wise on user granularity) the country-specific percentages of
the user profile field visibility to be either ’public’, ’only
friends’, ’only me’ or ’custom’. The Benjamini & Hochberg
correction [4] has been applied to adjust p-values for multiple
comparisons (28 pairwise comparisons). Table IV provides the
results.
Country-specific content sharing differences can be even
stronger realized by comparing the visibility of certain profile
fields in different countries. We thus choose a sample of seven
fields to explain the differences in Figures 13 till 18.
Austria
Switzerland
Germany
Egypt
Spain
France
Netherlands
United States
Public Friends Only me CustomCondition: Filled Not filled
Languages Languages
Fig. 13. Privacy settings of the field ’languages’
Evaluating the languages field (Figure 13), we realized that
Egyptian users do only rarely include the languages into their
profiles. However, in case they do, they share this information
with the public. This is a very different behavior, compared to
other countries. We would thus suspect Egyptians not to speak
other languages very often but in case they do, they seem to
be very proud of it. Spanish users do share the information
about their languages significantly more often than users from
USA and Austria. That is less significant but still valid for
Swiss users, too.
Another country-specific difference in sharing interest can
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Country Country W p-value BH Field
Egypt Austria 213.5 0.00064 0.01352 Languages
Egypt France 10.5 0.00702 0.01776 Languages
Egypt Germany 4613 0.00324 0.01469 Languages
Egypt Netherl. 10.5 0.00248 0.01469 Languages
Egypt USA 17.5 0.00154 0.0143 Languages
Spain Austria 289 0.00539 0.0151 Languages
Spain USA 53 0.00970 0.0209 Languages
Egypt Netherl. 343.5 0.00097 0.01352 Hometown
Egypt Germany 20119 0.00357 0.01469 Religious V.
France Egypt 399.5 0.00407 0.01469 Family
France Germany 22835 0.00761 0.01776 Family
France Netherl. 495 0.00499 0.01508 Family
France Switzerl. 316.5 0.00420 0.01469 Family
TABLE V
SUBSET OF SIGNIFICANT RESULTS OF THE PAIRWISE MANN–WHITNEY U
TEST OF NON-CUMULATED DATA; W = TEST STATISTIC; BH = BENJAMINI
& HOCHBERG CORRECTION FOR MULTIPLE COMPARISONS
Austria
Switzerland
Germany
Egypt
Spain
France
Netherlands
United States
Public Friends Only me CustomCondition: Filled Not filled
HometownHometown
Fig. 14. Privacy settings of the field ’hometown’
be observed at the profile field ’Hometown’ (Figure 14).
Egyptian FPW users share the name of the hometown with
a significantly higher probability with the public than FPW
users from the Netherlands. However, the highest fraction of
users who added the hometown to the user profile is from
Spain.
Austria
Switzerland
Germany
Egypt
Spain
France
Netherlands
Public Friends Only me CustomCondition: Filled Not filled
Religious views Religious views
United States
Fig. 15. Privacy settings of the field ’religious views’
The religious views (Figure 15) are less likely to be included
in the Facebook profile of the FPW users than e.g. the
hometown or the family status. Only among Egyptian users,
a majority of people can be observed to add the religious
views to the user profile in Facebook. Furthermore, the Egyp-
tians form the group that publishes this information with the
highest likelihood. This observation can be used to found the
hypothesis that religious views and their public commitments
are more important in Egypt than in the other countries that
we consider in this paper.
Information about the family status (Figure 16) is very likely
to be included into the profiles. The overwhelming fraction of
Family
Austria
Switzerland
Germany
Egypt
Spain
France
Netherlands
United States
Family
Public Friends Only me CustomCondition: Filled Not filled
Fig. 16. Privacy settings of the field ’family’
users prefer to share this information only with friends. In
comparison to others, French users tend to restrict access to
this profile field. Remarkable is that this is the field which is
hidden by the largest fraction of people.
Austria
Switzerland
Germany
Egypt
Spain
France
Netherlands
United States
Public Friends Only me CustomCondition: Filled Not filled
HometownRelati nship statusRelationship status
Fig. 17. Privacy settings of the field ’relationship status’
Comparing the visibility of the relationship status of Spanish
and Egypt FPW users (Figure 17) is very interesting. Spanish
FPW users are the subset with the lowest probability of filling
and publishing the field ’relationship status’. With the highest
probability compared to others, they share this information
with only a selected subset of friends. In contrast, nearly half
of the Egyptians publish their relationship status. At the same
time, they are also the subset of FPW user with the highest
likelihood to hide this bit of information.
The friend list (Figure 18) is the sole profile field in this
evaluation which exists in every user profile without being
empty. Users do not have the choice to upload a friend list or
not: it is created automatically by adding friends. In case that
users prefer not to share this information, their only chance
is to hide the list by choosing the visibility setting ’only
me’. Accordingly, the latter setting is very popular. This is
especially true for the subset of Egypt FPW users.
Friendlist
Austria
Switzerland
Germany
Egypt
Spain
France
Netherlands
United States
Public Friends Only me Custom
Fig. 18. Privacy settings of the field ’friend list’
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B. Country-Specific Changes of Privacy Settings
In Section V-A, we elaborated the privacy settings in
different countries and distinguished between different fields.
The main finding was that users from different countries share
different information with their friends or the public. Since all
users are faced with the same default privacy settings while
having different sharing desires, the necessity of changing the
visibility settings to meet the own sharing desires thus also
differs. In this section, we elaborate the change actions which
have been performed with the help of the FPW with respect
to the user’s country of origin.
In the remainder of this section, we distinguish among
four subsets of users. The first subset, denoted only less
private, consists of users who only changed visibility settings
towards a higher visibility, e.g. from ’friends’ to ’public’ or
from ’only me’ to ’friends’. The second subset consists of
users who changed the visibility less private. That means the
users perform changes in both directions but those changes
which grant more access to profile fields prevail the others.
Accordingly, we denote the third and the fourth subset more
private and only more private were the third subset consists
of users who mainly changed to a more private setting and
the fourth subset of users who only restricted access to profile
fields.
We ignored two subsets which could be built when fol-
lowing the previous logic: those users who did not change
anything and those users who changed the privacy settings
equally to both direction. The latter have been ignored since
the subset contains many users who only tried our new
interface and changed one field in both directions. The subset
of users who did not change anything can hardly be evaluated
since this subset contains those users who faced technical
problems, thus unable to perform changes.
All
Austria
Switzerland
Germany
Egypt
Spain
France
Netherlands
USA
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Only less private 
Less private 
More private 
Only more private 
Fig. 19. Fractions of users grouped by change directions of actions with
FPW
Figure 19 shows the distribution of the four clusters in
our top eight countries. The relative cluster sizes are different
amongst the mentioned countries and the majority of the FPW
users changes the visibility of profile fields towards one of the
two possible directions. Surprisingly, in spite of advertising
the FPW as a tool to increase the privacy, the fraction of users
who only used the FPW to change the privacy settings to less
private settings is relatively high (30.92% of the sum of the
four clusters). In Spain, the latter is even higher than 50%. In
total, the FPW caused less information to be accessible.
Comparing the privacy settings in Figure 12 and the change
actions in Figure 19 draws a homogeneous picture: The two
countries with the least conservative settings are those with
the highest fraction of users in the cluster only less private.
Switzerland and the Netherlands are at the opposite of the
range in both illustrations.
VI. CHANGE DIRECTION CLUSTERS
The clear distinction of clusters in Figure 19 inspired us
to evaluate the differences in the user profiles to examine
implications of privacy preferences on profile properties. In
Tables VI and VII, we compare the mean and median of the
countable profile properties ’Friends’, ’Likes’, ’Photos’, ’Map
Entries’ and ’Notes’ with respect to clusters and countries.
Users in the cluster only more private have more friends
(median) than others but less likes and less map entries. Users
in the cluster more private still have more friends than those
who used the FPW to increase the visibility of profile fields.
Also notable is that users in the cluster only less private do
not mind to tell Facebook their location by having more map
entries. Notes are not very popular amongst our set of users.
The mean of 19.87 in the more private cluster is a result of a
fringe group of users having plenty of notes.
Table VII shows the mean and the median of the same
set of countable profile properties as they can be found in
Table VI. Obvious differences among country clusters are that
Egyptian FPW users who sent us feedback have more friends
and more likes than all others. The cluster of Dutch FPW users
is the opposite extreme, having 18 times less likes (median)
than Egyptian cluster. The Spanish users share 60 pictures, the
German 2 (median).
Suddenly, comparing the differences amongst our four
change direction clusters in Table VI exhibits notably smaller
differences than comparing user profile differences amongst
users from different countries in Table VII. All values in Table
VI are very close to the values in the line ’Germany’ in Table
VII. The reason is that the majority of the FPW users in this
study is German. It underlines the influence factor country of
origin to dominate the change direction.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented the first large-scale study about
content sharing and privacy preferences of Facebook users
with special focus on country-specific characteristics. It is
based on 9,292 feedbacks from 4,182 users in 102 countries.
Our sample is neither complete nor a result of a random
sampling process (Section III). Yet, the huge media attention
from radio stations and daily newspapers, which address
ordinary people, shows that the FPW was assumed to be
interesting for their recipients. Furthermore, the fact that a
very big fraction of users discloses more information instead
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Cluster
Friends Likes Photos Map entries Notes
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Only more private 171.48 112 106.03 39 22.34 3 38.69 4 0.48 0
More private 163.64 107 131.69 49 19.16 3 46.95 4 19.87 0
Less private 177.11 88 142.58 49 28.81 2 49.87 7 1.86 0
Only less private 186.49 91 125.69 55 22.69 4 98.32 11 0.71 0
TABLE VI
PROFILE STATISTIC COMPARISON WITH RESPECT TO CHANGE DIRECTION CLUSTERS
Country
Friends Likes Photos Map entries Notes
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
United States 201.41 115 156.47 73 45.64 8 24.68 4 1.93 0
Netherlands 111.63 90 33.50 10 17.70 8 47.73 21 0.03 0
France 267.81 112 129.22 44 47.78 10 82.63 5 30.86 0
Spain 148.78 117 127.97 23 98.37 60 102.05 7 2.94 0
Egypt 331.86 150 455.70 181 61.86 17 25.29 2 7.93 8
Germany 154.54 93 102.22 35 15.38 2 45.61 4 0.52 0
Switzerland 225.52 131 185.41 40 28.30 6 67.48 9 50.58 0
Austria 275.83 193 171.46 96 36.55 16 108.91 5 1.60 0
TABLE VII
PROFILE STATISTIC COMPARISON WITH RESPECT TO COUNTRIES
of hiding it with the FPW is a strong evidence that it is not
used by a fringe group of privacy savvy people.
In contrast to related work in the field of privacy prefer-
ences, we collect our data on the users’ clients and evaluate
the behavior from real users who perform audience selection
on their own user profiles for their own reasons. However, even
the evaluation of the actual privacy settings is only a rough
estimation of the sharing preferences that suffers from two
imprecisions: (i) Many users are unable to properly choose
their audience with Facebook’s privacy setting interface, and
(ii) the sharing preferences exhibit a vast diversity depending
on the user’s country of origin.
To overcome those imprecisions, we evaluated changes that
have been made using color-coding based privacy controls.
In a previous study, the latter have been demonstrated to be
usable, intuitive and effective to drastically reduce errors and
efforts in selecting the audience [19].
We further elaborated the country-specific differences in
both the privacy settings as well as the privacy change actions.
Additionally, a cluster analysis highlights the relation between
the impact of the FPW on users’ audience selection decisions
and their countable profile properties.
When creating an account in Facebook, it is obligatory to
reveal information about gender, e-mail and birthday while
creating an account on Facebook. However, our results indicate
that the majority of FPW users sufficiently trusts Facebook
to confide personal information such as family status, current
city, hometown, employer and school. Contrariwise, only a mi-
nority of FPW users includes information on skills, addresses
or political views into their profiles.
The most popular audience selection strategy is to allow
all friends to access a certain bit of information, followed by
publishing it and disclosing it to only a subset of friends.
The setting ’only me’ is the least popular setting. Beside
unpopular features such as subscriptions and websites, the
current city, the hometown, languages and the employees are
the most frequently published bits. Only very few FPW users
publish their e-mail address, instant messenger ID and their
birthday, but the majority shares these bits with their friends.
The friend list is a divisive issue amongst users to decide about
its audience. Being published by more than one third of all
FPW users, the friend list is the profile field that the second
largest fraction of users is hiding (setting ’only me’).
Introducing the comprehensible color-coding interface of
the FPW impacts the audience selection of users. In spite of
the FPW being advertised as a privacy tool, users disclose
selected bits of information to the public and to the complete
set of friends. Users mainly change the privacy settings for
timeline entries, the friend list and the profile field ’employer’.
While the visibility of the timeline entries and the field
employer are roughly equally switched to more and less
restrictive privacy settings, the friend list setting was preferred
to be more restrictive by 83% of our participants. The total
amount of content which is visible to Facebook users does
not dramatically decrease after introducing a comprehensible
visualization of privacy controls, but the composition of the
visible content changes. This indicates that the usability of
Facebook’s privacy setting interface can be improved by using
color codings.
Which information is uploaded to Facebook as well as
which information is shared with whom is strongly depending
on the user’s country of origin. A perspicuous example is that
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less than 22% of the German FPW users shared their religious
views on Facebook while the majority of Egyptian FPW users
included their religious views into their user profiles. The
visibility is chosen accordingly. Thus, global default privacy
settings cannot meet the sharing interests of all users since
the sharing interests show country-specific as well as person-
specific differences.
Authors of alternative OSN architectures argue that fine-
grained access control is an important feature to improve
privacy in OSNs [9], [20], [5]. However, our FPW users tend
to remove group settings and individual access rules to achieve
a lower complexity of access rules. We construe this fact to
express user’s favor for simplicity and thus encourage privacy
interface designers to focus on simplicity rather than on a rich
set of functionality.
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